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INTRODUCTION
The Indiana Rules of Evidence ("Rules") were codified in 1994.' Since that
time, the rules have been applied, explained, and interpreted through court
decisions.2 They have also been refined through statutory revisions.3 This Article
describes the developments in Indiana evidence law during the survey period of
October 1, 2014, through September 30, 2015. This Article is not intended to
provide an exhaustive discussion of every case applying an Indiana Rule of
Evidence. Nor does the Article discuss every Indiana Rule of Evidence. Rather,
it summarizes the more important developments in this area of practice. The
discussion topics follow the order of the Rules.
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS (RULES 101-106)
According to Rule 101 (a), the Rules apply to all court proceedings in Indiana
unless "otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or Indiana,
by the provisions of this rule, or by other rules promulgated by the Indiana
Supreme Court."4 Where issues are not specifically addressed in the Rules,
common law and statutory law apply. 5 United States District Court Judge Robert
L. Miller, Jr., of the Northern District of Indiana has explained this as follows:
[I]n resolving an evidentiary issue, a court must consult the evidence
rules first; if they provide an answer, all other sources, whether statutory
or earlier case law, are to be disregarded. In deciding whether the
evidence rules provide an answer, the rules are to be construed in
accordance with the principles articulated in Rule 102. If the evidence
rules provide no answer, the court must turn to common law and
statutory sources.6
Rule 102 states the Rules should be construed so as "to administer every
proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
B.A., magna cur laude, Columbia University; J.D., Columbia University School of Law; Ph.D.,
University of Colorado at Boulder.
1. See generally IND. R. EvID.
2. See, e.g., Caldwell v. State, 43 N.E.3d 258,261 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 43 N.E.3d
243 (Ind. 2015); Smart v. State, 40 N.E.3d 963, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); Bell v. State, 29 N.E.3d
137, 141 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 32 N.E.3d 238 (Ind. 2015).
3. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 26-1-2-202 (2015).
4. IND. R.EvID. 101.
5. IND.R.EvID. 101(b).
6. ROBERT L. MILLER, JR., INDIANA PRACTICE SERIES: COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON INDIANA
EVIDENCE § 102 cmt. 1 (2013).
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development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing
a just determination." 7
I. JUDICIAL NOTICE (RULE 201)
The court may take judicial notice of the types of matters referenced in Rule
201.8 Among other things, the court mayjudicially notice any fact that "(A) is not
subject to reasonable dispute because it is generally known within the trial
court's territorial jurisdiction, or (B) can be accurately and readily determined
from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."9 In Smart v.
State, the defendant challenged his conviction for unlawful possession of a
syringe." The defendant was convicted under Indiana Code section 16-42-19-
18. 1 This statute made illegal the possession of a syringe "adapted for the use of
a legend drug by injection in a human being."'" Smart argued the State had the
burden to demonstrate methamphetamine was categorized as a legend drug. 13 The
court of appeals agreed with the defendant that for the conviction to stand, the
State had to establish that methamphetamine was a legend drug.14 It also agreed
the State had failed to make the required showing.'5 The only evidence at the trial
court that methamphetamine was a legend drug was the trial court's "judicial
notice" of such.16 The court of appeals, however, concluded whether
methamphetamine qualified as a legend drug was not a fact "'not subject to
reasonable dispute' or a fact that 'can be accurately and readily determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. '17 Accordingly, the
evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction for possession of a syringe.' 8
I1. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS (RULES 401-413)
A. Relevance and Probative Value Versus Unfair Prejudice
(Rules 401 and 403)
Rule 401 provides that "[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b)
the fact is of consequence in determining the action."' 19 Rule 402 "provides that
7. IND. R. EVID. 102.
8. IND. R. EviD. 201.
9. Id.
10. Smart v. State, 40 N.E.3d 963, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 968.
16. Id.
17. Id. (quoting IND. R. EVID. 20 1(a)).
18. Id.
19. IND. R. EVID. 401.
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relevant evidence is generally admissible and irrelevant evidence inadmissible., 21
On the other hand, courts are not required to admit all relevant evidence: they
may refuse admission of otherwise relevant evidence if admission is prohibited
by the Indiana or Federal Constitution, a statute, other provisions within the
Indiana Rules of Evidence, or other court rules.2'
Rule 403 also operates to limit the admission of relevant evidence. Under
that rule, a court may determine evidence that is relevant to be inadmissible if its
value as evidence is substantially outweighed by any of the following: potential
confusion of issues, unfair prejudice, undue delay, or accumulation of evidence.
22
The court of appeals elaborated upon and applied both Rules 401 and 403 in
Duncan v. State.' The defendant was convicted of, among other things, felony
pointing a firearm, felony possession of marijuana, and felony resisting law
enforcement. 24 On appeal, the court considered the defendant's argument that
ammunition found in his garage was either irrelevant or should have been
excluded under Rule 403's balancing test.25 First, the court rejected Duncan's
argument that "the ammunition had nothing to do with any issue in this case..
• [because] he did not dispute that he possessed the gun or that he knew it was
loaded, but instead only contested whether he voluntarily pulled the trigger.,
26
The court found contrary to what Duncan seemed to argue, the universe of
relevant evidence is not narrowed by a defendant's theory of defense. Rather,
the State had to prove every element of each offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.28 Nor did the defendant formally stipulate he possessed the gun or he
knew it was real and loaded.29 Even if the defendant had stipulated these facts,
the court emphasized the State is entitled to prove its case by the evidence of its
own choice.3" Here, the court found the presence of ammunition of the same
caliber as that used in the commission of the crime, located in a bag with the
defendant's social security card and birth certificate, tended to make it more
likely that the defendant "possessed the gun and loaded it, both facts that were
relevant to the charges in this case. ' 31
Second, the court found Rule 403 did not bar admission of the evidence at
issue.32 Again, the defendant's argument centered on his theory of defense:
20. Bell v. State, 29 N.E.3d 137, 141 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 32 N.E.3d 238 (Ind.
2015).
21. IND. R. EvID. 402.
22. IND. R. EviD. 403.
23. 23 N.E.3d 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, 26 N.E.3d 982 (Ind. 2015).
24. Id. at 807-08.
25. Id. at 809-10.
26. Id. at 810.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 811.
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because he did not dispute that he possessed a gun, the probative value of the
evidence should be weighed with that in mind.3 3 The court, however, stated that
a defendant's Rule 403 objection "and his offer to concede a point generally
cannot prevail over the government's choice to offer evidence showing guilt and
all the circumstances surrounding the offense."' Nor did the court agree that
admitting the ammunition posed an overly great risk of unfair prejudice.35 The
amount of ammunition was not extraordinary--eighty-four nine millimeter
cartridges. 36 Also, the ammunition was the same caliber and type as that found
with the gun used in the commission of the charged offenses and did not
therefore suggest the defendant owned more than one gun.37
The Indiana Court of Appeals considered another Rule 403 challenge in Bell
v. State.3 8 First, it noted the task of weighing probative value against potential
dangers is "a discretionary task best performed by the trial court., 3 9 Further, on
the question of "unfair prejudicial impact, courts should look for the dangers that
the jury will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or that the
evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury."4° In the
case before it, the court concluded the trial court had not erred in admitting the
defendant's statement to the effect that he could "read a person by the way they
acted." 41 The statement was relevant to the charges in the case, namely that the
defendant committed rape by knowingly having sexual intercourse with a person
who was "unaware that sexual intercourse was occurring."42 Specifically, the
statement made it more likely than not the defendant knew the victim was
unaware that they were engaged in sexual intercourse.43 On the other side of the
balancing test, the court of appeals found no danger of unfair prejudice because
the characteristic of being good at "reading" people was "not a negative one that
might unfairly prejudice the jury against Bell."44 Moreover, that the "statement
may have been damaging to Bell's defense theory is not grounds for exclusion
of the statement. ' 45
B. Evidence of Character, Crimes, and Other Bad Acts (Rule 404)
In the above-mentioned Bell v. State, the court of appeals also addressed the
33. Id. at 810-11.
34. Id. at 811 (quoting Kellett v. State, 716 N.E.2d 975, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).
35. Id. at 811.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 29 N.E.3d 137, 142 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 32 N.E.3d 238 (Ind. 2015).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 140-42.
43. Id. at 142.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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defendant's argument that admitting the statement violated Rule 404(a)'s
proscription against admitting character evidence "to prove that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." 6 To support its
conclusion that the statement did not constitute character evidence, the court
referenced the Indiana Supreme Court's definition of character in Malinski v.
State:47 "Character is a generalized description of a person's disposition, or of the
disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance or
peacefulness."4 8 The court of appeals also quoted federal District Court Judge
Miller:
Wigmore defined character as "the actual moral or psychical disposition,
or sum of the traits." Graham defines character as "the nature of a
person, his disposition generally, or his disposition in respect to a
particular trait." McCormick defines it as "a generalized description of
a person's disposition, or of the disposition in respect to a general trait.49
Applying these definitions, the court concluded Bell's statement about "his
ability to 'read' people" was not a character trait.50 Instead, the statement was"more of a bragging description of his ability, not his character."', Accordingly,
the trial court acted properly in admitting it.
52
Rule 404(b) sets out specific exceptions to Rule 404(a)'s proscription against
admitting character evidence.53 Under Rule 404(b)(1), "[e]vidence of a crime,
wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with [that]
character."' Under Rule 404(b)(2), however, such evidence may be admitted for
other reasons, such as "proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." 55 The identity
exception was the subject of the court of appeals' decision in Caldwell.56 There,
the defendant challenged his conviction for burglary and attempted rape and
argued the trial court erred in admitting into evidence that he had looked into the
window of another woman's house in the same neighborhood fifty-seven days
46. Id.
47. 794 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 2003).
48. Bell, 29 N.E.3d at 142-43 (quoting Malinski v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1071, 1083 (Ind.
2003)).
49. Id. at 143 (quoting ROBERT L. MILLER, JR., INDIANA PRACTICE SERIES: INDIANA
EVIDENCE § 404.101 (3d ed. 2014)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See IND. R. EVID. 404.
54. Caldwell v. State, 43 N.E.3d 258, 261 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 43 N.E.3d 243 (Ind.
2015).
55. IND. R. EVID. 404(b).
56. Caldwell, 43 N.E.3d 258.
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after the crime at issue.57 The court of appeals agreed.58
The court explained the identity exception was "crafted primarily for
'signature' crimes with a common modus operandi."59 The rationale is the two
crimes are so similar and unique that one could conclude the same person likely
committed them. By way of illustration, the Caldwell court referenced a decision
in Allen v. State.60 In Allen, the evidence showed the victim had been bound with
duct tape and raped.6 At the scene, the police also found a note with the
defendant's pager number and a reference to the name "Play." 62 Those facts
were such that the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision to
permit introduction of evidence connecting the defendant to another rape-one
where the victim had been bound with duct tape, had the same pager number, and
knew the defendant by the name "Play., 63 The Caldwell court, however,
concluded in the case before it the required level of similarity between crimes
was not present so as to allow application of the identity exception. 64 It said that
although the victims were similar and the crimes occurred in the same area, there
were "stark differences between the crimes. 65 Specifically, one involved a break-
in and attempted rape,66 while the other involved no break-in and no attempted
rape.67 Without more striking similarities between the crimes, the Caldwell court
could not conclude they were "signature crimes., 68 Nevertheless, the court of
appeals found admitting the evidence of the prior crime was harmless given the
other substantial evidence linking the defendant to the crime.69
Whether "other crimes" evidence was properly admitted to demonstrate the
defendant's "plan" to have sex with the victim was the subject of Guffey v.
State.7° In that case, the defendant was convicted of conspiring to molest the
twelve-year-old son of his girlfriend.7' On appeal, he argued the trial court
improperly admitted evidence of recorded telephone conversations wherein he
urged the victim's mother to have sex with the boy, stating the conversations
related to uncharged conduct and were unrelated to a sexual offense charge.72
57. Id. at 262-63.
58. Id. at 266.
59. Id. at 261.
60. 720 N.E.2d 707 (Ind. 1999).
61. Id. at 710.
62. Id.
63. Id. at711-12.
64. Caldwell, 43 N.E.3d at 266.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 267.
70. 42 N.E.3d 152 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 43 N.E.3d 243 (Ind. 2015).
71. Id. at 165.
72. Id. at 159.
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The court of appeals disagreed.73 Instead, it agreed with the State the
conversations were relevant to a "matter other than Guffey's propensity to
commit the charged act"--in this case, planning and grooming.74 The court
explained grooming is the "'process of cultivating trust with a victim and
gradually introducing sexual behaviors until reaching the point' where it is
possible to perpetrate a crime against the victim. 75 The conversations in which
the defendant encouraged his girlfriend to expose her son to alcohol and sexual
acts were done to prepare the child to be more comfortable with the planned
molestation. 76 Finally, the court of appeals also concluded the recorded
conversations were relevant to a matter other than the defendant's propensity to
commit the charged crime because they occurred close in time to the final phone
conversation before the molestation and therefore completed the story of the
crime.77
C. Evidence of Rape Victim's Character (Rule 412)
The Indiana Supreme Court considered the intersection between Indiana Rule
of Evidence Rule 412 and the Sixth Amendment confrontation right in Hall v.
State.78 There, the defendant, who was convicted of child molesting, argued the
court erred in prohibiting him from (1) asking questions of the victim's mother
at deposition and (2) introducing the tape of a phone call at trial between the
victim's mother and the defendant concerning the victim's past conduct involving
consensual touching with a young boy of the same age as the victim.
79
Apparently, the victim had initially suggested that the touching during the past
incident was without her consent. 80 Thus, the defendant argued the incident was
relevant impeachment evidence to show the victim had previously made a false
accusation of rape.81 The trial court prohibited the defendant from inquiring
about the incident during deposition and from admitting phone call evidence
about it at trial, citing Rule 412 and its general prohibition against admitting
evidence involving alleged sexual misconduct to prove a victim's prior sexual
behavior or predisposition. 82 In a split decision, the court of appeals found the
trial court abused its discretion in precluding both the deposition questions and
the phone call evidence. 83
The Indiana Supreme Court began its review of the case by explaining Rule
73. Id. at 161.
74. Id. at 160-61.
75. Id. at 161 (quoting Piercefield v. State, 877 N.E.2d 1213, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 36 N.E.3d 459 (Ind. 2015).
79. Id. at 462-63, 466.
80. Id. at 462.
81. Id. at466.
82. Id. at 463.
83. Id. at 466.
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412 does not bar admission of alleged sexual misconduct evidence when it is
offered to prove false accusations of rape for the purposes of impeaching witness
credibility-as opposed to the witness's general character.84 Under Rule 412
there is a distinction between evidence of sexual conduct, which is precluded,
and evidence of verbal conduct such as a prior rape allegation, which is not
precluded. 85 Because the answer to the deposition question posed to the victim's
mother could have revealed potentially relevant trial evidence as to the victim's
credibility, the Indiana Supreme Court found that the trial court "should have
granted Hall's motion to compel discovery in order to fully secure his Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses against him., 86 The court, however,
concluded the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not
contribute to the guilty verdict.87 Because the error was harmless, it did not
require reversal.88
As to the phone call, the defendant argued the State opened the door to
additional questions about the call between himself and the victim's mother
during its direct examination of the victim's mother.89 The court agreed, noting
the long-settled premise that otherwise inadmissible evidence may become
admissible when a party opens the door such that without further information the
evidence elicited would leave the trier of fact with a misleading impression of the
facts.9° In this case, as the jury heard it from the State's questioning on direct,
during the phone call, the defendant was "baselessly fishing for ways to destroy
[the alleged victim's] credibility."'" The defendant, however, wanted to show he
was seeking information about the incident during that phone call because it"could have been a prior accusation of sexual misconduct" by the victim.92
Again, though, the court found the trial court's error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.93 It stated that "although Hall was not able to play the phone
conversation for the jury or question [the mother] about the call, the State
presented ample evidence of Hall's guilt and demonstrated beyond a reasonable
doubt that the confrontation error did not contribute to the verdict against him."'
Justices Rucker and Rush dissented from the decision in Hall with a separate
opinion.95 The justices agreed with the majority that the trial court violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by improperly excluding the evidence about
84. Id. at 467.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 468.
88. Id. at 467-70.
89. Id. at471.
90. Id.
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 472.
94. Id. at 474.
95. Id. (Rucker, J., dissenting).
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the incident.96 The dissent, however, took issue with the majority's harmless error
analysis, which it said was incorrect in focusing on the entirety of the evidence.'
The dissent instead concluded when one focused on the witness specifically, the
error was not harmless and, indeed, contributed to a guilty verdict.98 Specifically,
precluding the line of questioning about the victim's prior accusation denied the
defendant his constitutional right to cross-examine the victim's mother and
deprived him of impeachment evidence regarding the victim.99 Finally, because
the State did not demonstrate that the error did not "contribute to the verdict," the
dissent could not conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
WY. WITNESS TESTIMONY (RULES 601-617)
In Ferguson v. State, the court of appeals was called upon to address for the
first time in Indiana the question of whether certain comments by a judge
violated Rule 605. 101 The defendant argued the trial court had acted as a witness
during trial because it used the words "though heartfelt" when admonishing the
jury. 0 2 Specifically, the judge instructed the jury that "[t]he opinions of other
people, though heartfelt, are not something you can consider, all right."' 0 3 The
appellate court began its analysis of the issue by noting the trial judge was not
sworn in as a witness and did not testify in the usual sense of the word.'" It then
looked to evidence regarding the purpose of Rule 605, which is that allowing a
presiding judge also to be a witness in the case over which he is presiding would
be inconsistent with his duty of impartiality.'0 5 The bright line rule is thus that a
judge cannot be sworn in and take the stand in a case over which he is
presiding." 6 The court, however, noted the absence of such a bright line to
govern in cases where a judge might be acting as a witness in less overt ways. 1
07
The court of appeals stated whether a judge has become a witness in a less overt
ways involves analysis under "judicial fair comment and not the evidentiary
rule."'0 8 "Error is found where the judge's comments add to the evidence and are
not merely summarizations of or fair comment on evidence already adduced at
trial."" Applying this test, the court concluded the trial judge's "though
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 476-77.
99. Id. at 476.
100. Id. at 477.
101. 40 N.E.3d 954, 955 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 40 N.E.3d 858 (Ind. 2015).
102. Id. at 957.
103. Id. at 956.
104. Id. at957.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 957-58.
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heartfelt" comment was neither testimony nor improper comment on an issue to
be decided by the jury. "' Rather, the trial court was instructing the jury properly
not to consider the opinions of others when analyzing the credibility of
witnesses."' The words "though heartfelt" merely added emphasis to that
instruction by saying it was not relevant how "heartfelt" such opinions may have
been. 12
Several recent Indiana cases address witness testimony as it relates to
impeachment. In Jacobs v. State,'1 3 the Indiana Supreme Court considered the
parameters of Rule 608 as they related to the defendant's claim that he should
have been able to introduce certain impeachment evidence against the child
victim in a case charging him with child molestation. 4 The court explained that
pursuant to Rule 608(a), one may attack or support the credibility of a witness
with evidence in the form of opinion or reputation for truthfulness. '5 Under Rule
608(b), however, one may not inquire into, or prove by extrinsic evidence,
specific instances of bad conduct." 6 The court held because the defendant"attempted to delve into specific instances of [the child victim's] conduct,
namely whether [he] had lied to his mother on prior occasions," the evidence was
not admissible under Rule 608.' " First, it was not opinion or reputation
evidence." 8 Second, it specifically violated Rule 608(b)'s prohibition on
evidence about specific instances of bad conduct." 9
The Indiana Court of Appeals considered the applicability of Rules 607,
608(b), and 616 in Wilson v. State; a case where the defendant was convicted of
murdering a pizza delivery person. 20 The defendant contended the trial court
erred in not allowing him to cross-examine a witness at trial about the number of
times he had previously been arrested.' 2' The witness was not involved in the
crime, but was present when the defendant stated in front of several people he
had just shot someone. 22 The defendant argued the evidence was admissible to
show a prior inconsistent statement, inasmuch as the witness stated during a
deposition prior to trial he had only been arrested once previously, even though
he had apparently been arrested four times.2 3 According to the defendant, this
evidence would show the witness was not credible at trial because he had lied in
110. Id. at 958.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 22 N.E.3d 1286 (Ind. 2015).
114. Id. at 1289.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 39 N.E.3d 705, 711 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 40 N.E.3d 857 (Ind. 2015).
121. Id. at 712.
122. Id. at 716-17.
123. Id. at 708.
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a sworn deposition.124
On appeal, Wilson conceded Rules 404(b) and 609 would not permit
extrinsic evidence regarding the acts for which the witness was arrested but not
convicted.125 He claimed, however, the evidence was admissible under Rules 607,
608(b), and 616.126 The court of appeals disagreed. 127 First, it explained Rule 607
permits the introduction of evidence to attack a witness's credibility and Rule
616 permits attacking such credibility with evidence of bias or prejudice for or
against a party. 128 The court rejected the defendant's argument that understating
the number of prior arrests showed the witness was trying to minimize his
culpability, noting the witness had no culpability in this case. 2 9 The court further
stated it failed to see how any inconsistency in the number of prior arrests is
relevant to bias, prejudice, or interest against the defendant.' 30 The court also
found Rule 608(b) inapposite. '31 As to non-conviction misconduct, the court may
allow specific instances of misconduct to be inquired into "'if they are probative
of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness whose
character the witness being cross-examined has testified about.'" 32 The Rule, the
court stated, would only apply in this case if the defendant wanted to cross-
examine the witness "with regard to the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness-and [the witness] had already testified on
direct examination about that witness's character for truthfulness.""
33
Rule 613(b) and the parameters of allowing impeachment by inconsistent
statement was the subject of the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Griffith v.
State.34 At trial, Griffith sought to impeach the victim with two witnesses who
the defendant said would testify the victim told them a version of events that
differed from the victim's testimony at trial. 35 The question on appeal and before
the supreme court turned on whether the defendant had satisfied Rule 613(b)'s
prerequisites for impeachment. 36 Specifically, at the time of Griffith's trial,
Indiana's Rule 613(b) provided a party may only impeach a witness with a prior
inconsistent statement if "'the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or
deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the
witness thereon, or the interests ofjustice otherwise require." 137 The court noted
124. Id. at 710.
125. Id. at712.
126. Id.
127. Id. at712-13.
128. Id. at 713.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. 31 N.E.3d 965, 966 (Ind. 2015).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 971.
137. Id. (quoting IND. R. EVID. 613(b))
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it had affirmed in Hilton v. State a trial court ruling that excluded extrinsic
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement where the defendant did not first take
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the alleged inconsistent
statement. 138 The court, however, clarified the holding in Hilton does not stand
for the proposition that extrinsic evidence may never under any circumstances
be admitted before the witness is given the chance to explain or deny a prior
inconsistent statement. 131 Indeed, the court explained it did not explicitly address
in Hilton the full scope of when Rule 613(b) permits the introduction of extrinsic
evidence."4o
As to that scope, the Griffith court stated it was inclined to follow the federalinterpretation of the rule inasmuch as Indiana's Rule 613(b) uses the same
language as the federal rule.14' That interpretation affords great flexibility to trial
courts. Specifically, the witness must still be given an opportunity to explain or
deny, but not necessarily before extrinsic evidence of the statement is admitted. '42
Rather, the witness must only be permitted at some point to explain or deny. 4 3
Thus, the court held Rule 613(b) requires only that a witness be afforded the
opportunity to explain or deny at some point during the proceedings.' 44 Itnevertheless cautioned the preferred method is to provide that opportunity to the
witness before introducing extrinsic evidence because doing so has the benefit
of insuring the witness remains available, and also may make it easier for the jury
to understand the context of the intended impeachment.145 Finally, the court
urged trial courts to
consider a variety of relevant factors in making the determination to
admit or exclude extrinsic evidence, such as the availability of the
witness, the potential prejudice that may arise from recalling a witness
only for impeachment purposes, the significance afforded to the
credibility of the witness who is being impeached, and any other factors
that are relevant to the interests of justice. '46
As to whether the trial court improperly denied Griffith's proposed extrinsic
evidence in violation of Rule 613(b), the court found no abuse of discretion on
the facts before it. 147 First, there was no evidence the witness was available to berecalled to explain or deny the alleged prior statements.148 Second, the fact thattwo other eyewitnesses also identified Griffith as the initial aggressor diminished
138. Id. at 970 (citing Hilton v. State, 648 N.E.2d 361, 362 (Ind. 1995)).
139. Id. at 971.
140. Id. at 970.
141. Id. at 971-72.
142. Id. at 970-71.
143. Id. at971.
144. Id. at 972.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 973.
148. Id.
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the importance at trial of attacking this witness's testimony.149 Nor did the
defendant explain to the trial court why he failed to cross-examine the witness
while still on the stand or why the interests of justice otherwise required the
admission of the proposed extrinsic evidence. 50 Although it found no abuse of
discretion, the court also emphasized that on these facts, the trial court would not
have erred had it instead allowed the witness to be recalled and questioned about
the alleged prior inconsistent statement."'
V. LAY AND EXPERT WITNESSES (RULES 701-705)
The Rules employ limits on both lay and expert witness testimony.
According to Rule 701, lay witnesses may provide "opinion" testimony only if"rationally based on the witness's perception; and . . . helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness's testimony or to a determination of a fact in
issue. ' The court of appeals addressed the proper foundation for lay witness
opinion testimony in Whitlock v. Steel Dynamics, Inc. 53 The issue in that case
was whether the plaintiff in a personal injury case had sufficiently demonstrated
he was injured in a manner that would excuse him from failing to file his
compliant within the statute of limitations.154 The plaintiff alleged he was
"incompetent" for some nine days after the initial injury, such that he was
entitled to additional time to file.'55 To support his claim, he submitted affidavits
from his wife and mother-in-law addressing his alleged mental incompetence and
physical limitations.'56 Among other things, however, the court of appeals
concluded the affidavits did not meet the requirements of Rule 701 because they
"give general opinions without designating objective bases for the opinions.' 57
Rule 701 requires the witness to identify such objective bases because otherwise
the trial court has no way to assess whether the testimony is (1) rationally based
on the witness's perceptions and (2) helpful to the trier of fact. 158 In this case, the
affidavits contained statements to the effect that the plaintiff was "disoriented"
and "not all there."' 59 Because the opinions addressed the central issue of the
plaintiffs mental competence, the court held greater detail was required."
Rather than setting out such conclusions, the witnesses "were required to give
specific details which they perceived to be the basis for their conclusions that
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. IND. R. EvID. 701.
153. 35 N.E.3d 265 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 37 N.E.3d 960 (Ind. 2015).
154. Id. at 267-68.
155. Id. at 269.
156. Id. at 272-73.
157. Id. at 273.
158. Id. at 269.
159. Id. at 268.
160. Id.
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[the plaintiff] was mentally incompetent."6'
Judge May dissented in Whitlock, disagreeing that the affidavits failed to set
forth the required factual bases for the opinions stated therein. 162 For example,
Judge May noted the first affiant explained: "'He was disoriented, when he
would wake up you would try to talk to him and he would have to think a long
time about what he was saying before he said it.'"163 The same affiant also said:
"'[H]e was not all there, he would change the subject in the middle of what you
were talking about and forget what you were talking about and just quit
talking. "64 These, Judge May stated, were "specific details" explaining the basis
for the affiant's opinions. 165
The Indiana Supreme Court addressed the necessary foundation for skilled
lay witness opinion testimony in Buelna v. State.166 There, the defendant
challenged his Class A felony conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine
for insufficiency of the evidence. 67 The defendant argued the charge was
improperly enhanced from a Class B felony because at least three grams of the
drug were at issue. 168 The court of appeals rejected Buelna's argument, reasoning
the liquid sample tested contained some final product, such that the entire
thirteen-gram weight of the sample constituted "adulterated" methamphetamine
counting towards the weight to satisfy the enhancement.169
The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to consider Buelna's argument
that the enhancement was not proper because the thirteen gram liquid mixture
was not "adulterated."' 170 First, the court addressed as a matter of law the question
of whether an intermediate mixture a manufacturer is caught creating constitutes"adulterated" methamphetamine within the meaning of the statute prohibiting the
manufacture of the drug. 17 1 It concluded, based on an examination of the
language of the statute, evidence of legislative intent, and its own case law, that"'adulterated' methamphetamine is the final, extracted product that may contain
lingering impurities or has been subsequently debased or diluted by a foreign
substance-not an intermediate mixture that has not undergone the entire
manufacturing process."' 172 Thus, if the State relies on an unfinished chemical
mixture for the three-gram enhancement, it must show "how much final product
a defendant's particular manufacturing process would have yielded had it not
161. Id.
162. Id. at 274 (May, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 20 N.E.3d 137 (Ind. 2014).
167. Id. at 140.
168. Id. at 141.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 141-42.
172. Id. at 142.
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been interrupted by police or other intervening circumstances." 173 Such evidence
may come from a skilled witness under Rule 701-namely, a witness with
expertise beyond that of ordinary jurors, but not sufficient expertise to qualify as
an expert under Rule 702.174 For these purposes, such a skilled witness would be
one who regularly used or dealt in the drug or developed an acute ability to
assess the weight of the drugs in which they deal. 75 Here, the court found the
State presented direct testimony of actual, measured weight through the
testimony of two such skilled witnesses-the defendant's co-manufacturer and
a mutual friend.'76
Skilled lay opinion testimony under Rule 701 was also the subject of
Satterfield v. State.177 In that case, the defendant challenged his conviction for
murder and arson, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a
detective's testimony characterizing the defendant's answers during a police
interview as "evasive."1 78 In particular, the defendant argued the detective was
not qualified as a skilled lay witness under Rule 701 and also the detective was
not permitted to offer "human lie detector" testimony. 179 The Indiana Supreme
Court agreed the detective was not a skilled witness, but found his testimony was
admissible as ordinary lay opinion testimony. 80 First, the court explained an
ordinary or skilled lay witness may offer opinion testimony if (1) it is rationally
based on the perception of the witness and (2) it is helpful to the trier of fact.'
The first requirement means the "'opinion must be one that a reasonable person
could normally form from the perceived facts."" 82 The opinion testimony is
helpful "'if the testimony gives substance to facts, which were difficult to
articulate."" 83 The court concluded the detective's offered opinion about the
defendant's evasiveness was "no more insightful than what an ordinary lay
witness could have observed."''84 The opinion testimony, however, was "helpful
as a summary of the content and manner of answering questions," and was
therefore properly admitted as ordinary lay opinion testimony.'85 Nor was the
testimony otherwise improperly admitted "human lie detector" testimony.' 8 6 It is
true witnesses may not .' testify to opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence
173. Id. at 146.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 147.
176. Id. at 148.
177. 33 N.E.3d 344, 352 (Ind. 2015).
178. Id. at 351.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 354.
181. Id. at352.
182. Id. (quoting Davis v. State, 791 N.E.2d 266,268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).
183. Id. (quoting McCutchan v. Blanck, 846 N.E.2d 256, 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)).
184. Id. at352.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 354.
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in a criminal case [or] ... whether a witness has testified truthfully.""' 187 The
court, though, found that taken in context, the detective's summary of the
defendant's mode of answering questions-namely he minimized incriminating
information and maximized harmless information-was not inadmissible
commentary on the defendant's truthfulness. 88
The Rules place additional limits on expert testimony. Experts must be
qualified to testify based on knowledge, skill, training, or education.'89 In
addition, they may only testify to the extent their testimony will "help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."'" Experts,
however, are permitted to base their testimony and opinions on inadmissible
evidence as long as others in the same field reasonably rely on such evidence. 9
Before admitting scientific expert testimony, the trial court must first satisfy itself
that the testimony is grounded in "reliable scientific principles."'"
The admissibility of expert scientific testimony was the issue in Sciaraffa v.
State. 93 The defendant argued the trial court erred in permitting a forensic
scientist employed by the Indiana State Police to testify that a "glass bottle
presumptively 'indicated the presence of [m]ethamphetamine"' without requiring
the scientist to "explain the scientific principles and standards of a presumptively
positive test."' 94 The court of appeals disagreed.' 95 It began its analysis of the
issue by noting although the proponent of expert testimony bears the burden of
showing the foundation and reliability of scientific principles, no specific test is
required to satisfy Rule 702(b)'s requirements." 6 Instead, the trial court may
admit expert scientific testimony as long as it finds the evidence is sufficiently
trustworthy to assist the trier of fact. 97
In this case, that standard was satisfied. 198 The scientist was a professional
forensic scientist with extensive education and experience in drug analysis. 199
Further, she testified to the specific test performed and elaborated by explaining
the specialized tests she performed "are part of the normal testing procedure" for
methamphetamine and "require 'expert training to administer."' 200 Both such
tests are "generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. "201 The
187. Id. (quoting IND. R. EvIo. 704).
188. Id.
189. IND. R. EviD. 702(a).
190. Id.
191. IND. R. EvWD. 703.
192. IND. R. EVID. 702(b).
193. 28 N.E.3d 351 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 32 N.E.3d 239 (Ind. 2015).
194. Id. at 355-57.
195. Id. at 357-58.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 357.
198. Id. at 358.
199. Id. at 357.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 358.
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scientist did testify she could not perform the required confirmatory test in
addition to the "presumptive test" for the presence of a controlled substance
because "'there wasn't enough sample' to confirm the presumptive testing's
result. 2 0 2 But, while this meant the scientist could not be "scientifically certain
that it was methamphetamine," the inability to perform a confirmatory test did
not invalidate the presumptive test or make it inadmissible. °3 Rather, the
inability to confirm reflects on the weight of her testimony, which is a matter for
the jury.20 4
In 5200 Keystone Limited Realty, LLC, the court of appeals reached the
opposite conclusion about the admissibility of scientific expert opinion
testimony, holding the trial court did not err in excluding an environmental
expert's opinion that was speculative. 25 The dispute involved responsibility for
the environmental cleanup costs of commercial real estate.2° The trial court
excluded the plaintiff's proffered expert testimony to the effect that certain car
detailing operations had contributed to contamination of the site by using"petroleum hydrocarbons and chlorinated solvents." 207 Because the expert
admitted he had no knowledge of what chemicals the particular auto detailers
were using at any time, the court of appeals agreed the testimony as applied to
the instant case was based on nothing but "pure speculation," and thus, properly
excluded under Rule 702.208 The court distinguished the instant case from the
Vaughn case cited by the plaintiff, stating the expert in Vaughn had at least based
his opinion as to the safety of certain equipment on a drawing of that equipment
rendered by a defendant in that case.2' Here, by contrast, the proffered expert
admitted he had no actual evidence of what chemicals the detailers used, meaning
any testimony regarding their contribution to contamination would be based on
speculation, as opposed to any evidence.2t °
The rules regarding witness testimony also prohibit both lay opinion
witnesses and expert witnesses from testifying "to opinions concerning intent,
guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; whether
a witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions. 21' In Sampson v. State,
the Indiana Supreme Court addressed these limitations on opinion testimony in
a child molestation case where the defendant argued a child forensic interviewer
at Holly's House (a child and adult advocacy center for victims of intimate
crimes) had "improperly vouched" for the child victim during her testimony in
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 5200 Keystone Ltd. Realty, LLC v. Filmcraft Labs, Inc., 30 N.E.3d 5, 17 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015).
206. Id. at 6.
207. Id. at 10.
208. Id. at 10-11.
209. Id. at 10 (referencing Vaughn v. Daniels Co., 841 N.E.2d 1133 (Ind. 2006)).
210. Id. at 11.
211. IND. R. EvID. 704(b).
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violation of Rule 704(b).2 12 The interviewer testified at trial without objectionthat she was trained to detect signs that children had been coached to allege
abuse and she did not observe any signs the child victim in this case had been
coached.21 3 Specifically, the interviewer testified coaching is "where someone
has told a child what to say and typically it's somebody close to the child and it's
usually an untrue statement. 214 She further testified the signs of
coaching-which she did not observe in the child victim in this case-included,
among other things, an inability to recall specific details regarding the incident.1 5
To reach its conclusion in Sampson, the supreme court was called upon to
address two appellate court decisions (Kindred and Archer) that followed its owndecision in Hoglund v. State l.2 6 Based on a review of the holdings in those two
cases regarding "coaching testimony," the court stated:
[t]he underling question posed by Kindred and Archer is whether the
distinction between testimony that a child witness has or has not been
coached and testimony that the witness did or did not exhibit any "signs
or indicators" of coaching can be reconciled with the prohibition on
indirect vouching this Court disapproved in Hoglund.217
After surveying relevant jurisprudence of other jurisdictions, the court
answered the posed question in the negative.2t 8 Specifically, it held such subtle
distinctions characterizing an expert's testimony "is insufficient to guard against
the dangers that such testimony will constitute impermissible vouching" in
violation of Rule 704(b) and Hoglund.219 Rather,
when a jury is presented with expert testimony concerning certain
coaching behaviors, the invited inference that the child has or has not
been coached because the child fits the behavioral profile is likely to be
just as potentially misleading as expert testimony applying the coaching
behaviors to the facts of the case and declaring outright that a given child
has or has not been coached. 220
In both cases, there is a danger the jury will misapply the evidence. 221
Nevertheless, the court stated expert testimony about the signs of coaching andwhether a child exhibited such signs may be appropriate and is permissible
"provided [that] the defendant has opened the door to such testimony" by calling
212. Sampson v. State, 38 N.E.3d 985, 987-90 (Ind. 2015).
213. Id. at 988.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 962 N.E.2d 1230 (Ind. 2012); see also Archer v. State, 996 N.E.2d 341 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013); Kindred v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
217. Sampson, 38 N.E.3d at 990 (emphasis in original).
218. Id. at 991-92.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 991.
221. Id.
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the child victim's credibility into question.22 Thus, the court concluded the
interviewer's testimony in Sampson was improper under Rule 704(b) because
"'indirect vouching testimony is little different than testimony that the child
witness is telling the truth.' ,223 Nevertheless, the error in admitting the evidence
did not entitle Sampson to any remedy because he did not object to the testimony
at trial, nor did admitting the testimony produce a fundamental error such that the
defendant was denied the possibility of a fair trial.224
The court of appeals applied the Sampson holding in Hamilton v. State.
225
There, the defendant argued the trial court improperly admitted vouching
testimony by two different witnesses in violation of Rule 704(b).226 First, the
defendant challenged the testimony of a forensic interviewer regarding whether
she observed any indicators of coaching in two child molestation victims.
227
Second, the defendant challenged testimony about statements a detective made
during a pre-trial interview with the defendant to the effect that the allegations
of molestation were "powerful. 228
Applying Sampson, the court of appeals concluded all of the testimony by the
forensic interviewer about indicators of coaching constituted improper vouching
testimony deemed to "improperly invade the province of the jury to assess
witness credibility., 229 Further, the court of appeals disagreed with the trial court
that the defendant had "opened the door" to the testimony.230 Although the
defense had asked the child witnesses on cross-examination whether they had
been told what to say, the court of appeals stated this was "not equivalent to
presenting evidence that they had been told what to say, or creating a false
impression in the jury that they had been." 23 ' Because the court could not
conclude that admitting the interviewer's testimony was harmless, it reversed and
remanded.232 For purposes of remand, the court next addressed the defendant's
claim about the detective's use of the word "powerful" in describing the
allegations of molestation. 233 It stated that although statements made by police
during interrogations can potentially be problematic under Rule 704(b), it could
not say the detective's statements in the case before it amounted to improper
vouching given their context.234 Specifically, the detective talked about the
victim's powerful statements so as to attempt to elicit a response from the
222. Id. at 992 (emphasis added).
223. Id. (quoting Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ind. 2012)).
224. Id. at 992-93.
225. 43 N.E.3d 628 (Ind. Ct. App.), affd on reh 'g, 2015 WL 9598281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
226. Id. at 631.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 630-31.
229. Id. at 633.
230. Id. at 632.
231. Id. at 633.
232. Id. at 634-35.
233. Id. at 634.
234. Id.
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defendant during a police interview." Further, the defendant responded by
agreeing the allegations were powerful, but denying molesting.236 Thus, viewing
the detective's statements in the context of a police interview, the court did not
believe they carry the "same vouching force as trial testimony to that effect. 237
VI. HEARSAY (RULES 801-806)
Hearsay is a statement "not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing" and "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 2 38
Hearsay is typically not admissible evidence at trial unless the evidence satisfies
one of the rules setting out an exception to this general rule. 239
A. Rule 801-Hearsay Versus Nonhearsay
The rule against admitting hearsay only applies if the challenged evidence
satisfies the definition of hearsay. In Blount v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court
considered whether a detective's statement that two witnesses had told him the
defendant was the shooter was inadmissible hearsay. 24° The State defended the
admission of the evidence, arguing it was not admitted for the truth of the matter
asserted but rather constituted "course of investigation" evidence offered to show
why the police officers proceeded to seek out and arrest the defendant.2 4' The
court analyzed the issue by applying the test announced in the Craig case: (1)
whether the evidence describing an out-of-court statement asserted a fact that
could be proved true or false; (2) whether the evidentiary purpose of the
proffered statement was to prove the truth a fact asserted; and (3) whether the
fact to be proved under the suggested purpose of the statement was relevant to
an issue in the case and whether the danger of prejudice outweighed the
probative value.242 Applying this test led the court to conclude that the detective's
testimony was inadmissible hearsay.243 First, the statement that the defendant was
the shooter was susceptible to being true or false.244 Second, the State argued the
statement was offered to show the "course of investigation," meaning that the
statement was ostensibly not being offered for its truth.24 But applying the third
prong of the Craig test, the court concluded admitting the testimony was overly
prejudicial, particularly because the relayed witness statements identified the
defendant as the shooter, yet the witnesses were not available for cross-
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. IND. R. EVID. 801.
239. IND. R. EVID. 802.
240. 22 N.E.3d 559, 565-66 (Ind. 2015).
241. Id. at 565.
242. Id. at 567 (citing Craig v. State, 630 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1994)).
243. Id. at 568.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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examination at trial.246 Because the conviction was supported by independent
evidence of guilt, however, the court found the trial court's error in admitting the
evidence was not reversible. 247
The court of appeals addressed the hearsay definition in Phillips v. State 
48
in the context of a case charging the defendant with liability for the death of an
infant she placed in a broken portable crib. First, the court found the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence photographs of the
warning labels affixed to the broken crib.249 The court referenced the Craig case,
stating when an out-of-court statement is challenged as being hearsay, the first
question is whether the "statement asserts a fact susceptible of being true or
false. 25° If no such assertion is present, the statement cannot be hearsay.25' On
the other hand, if the statement does contain an assertion of fact, the court must
look to the evidentiary purpose of offering the statement to determine whether
it is hearsay.252 Here, the court found the majority of the statements on the labels
contained no assertion of fact that could be proven true or false; instead, they
were along the lines of instructions urging the crib's user not to do certain
things.253 Thus, they were not hearsay. As to the "declarative statements on the
labels"-for example, that failure to heed the warnings given could result in
injury or death-the court found they were also not hearsay because they were
not offered to "prove the facts asserted., 254 Rather, they were offered to show
only that warnings were given that would have been easily visible.255
B. Rule 801(d) (2)-Statement of a Party Opponent
The Indiana Court of Appeals considered the application of Rule 80 1 (d)(2)
in Harrison v. State.256 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the trial
court had erred in admitting a tape of a telephone call made from prison between
himself and an individual named Gee.257 The court explained any statements by
the defendant on the recording were statements by a party-opponent and therefore
admissible pursuant to Rule 801 (d)(2) regardless of whether offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.25 8 As to the comments by Gee, the court stated they
246. Id.
247. Id. at 568-69.
248. 25 N.E.3d 1284, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
249. Id. at 1288.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1289.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 32 N.E.3d 240, 253-56 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 35 N.E.3d 671 (Ind. 2015).
257. Id. at 255-56.
258. Id. at 255.
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were relatively innocuous for the most part.259 Only Gee's reply of"'Me, too"'
when the defendant stated he had ammonia in his lungs (from making
methamphetamine) was substantive. 26° Yet, to the extent that it was offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted-that Gee had ammonia in his lungs-the
court stated it was not convinced that admission of the statement affected the
defendant's substantial rights.2 1' The defendant also challenged the admission of
a recorded prison call between an inmate and the defendant's ex-girlfriend.262 In
this case, the court of appeals agreed with the defendant that admission violated
the hearsay rule.263 The court noted the call was being offered for the truth of the
matter stated.264 Nor did Rule 801 (d)(2) apply to these particular statements and
render them admissible, inasmuch as the defendant himself was not involved in
the phone call.265 However, the court concluded admitting the call was harmless
error because it was cumulative of other admitted evidence. 26
The court of appeals addressed the admissibility of an audio recording
containing a conversation between the defendant and a government confidential
informant (CI) in Mack v. State.2 67 The court there held the tape did not
contravene the rules against admitting hearsay evidence.268 It explained it has
long found statements by CIs are not hearsay because they are not admitted to
prove the truth of the matters asserted by the CI, but rather to provide context for
the defendant's own recorded statements. 269 Because the statements by the CI
were not nonhearsay, the Confrontation Clause also did not apply to bar their
admission.27°
C. Rule 801(d)(1)(b)-Prior Consistent Statement
Whether a statement satisfied Rule 801 (d)(1)(b)'s requirements for admitting
a statement that otherwise would constitute inadmissible hearsay was the subject
of the Indiana Court of Appeals' decision in Townsend v. State.27' According to
that rule,
a statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-
examination about a prior statement, the statement is consistent with the
declarant's testimony, and the statement is offered to rebut an express or
259. Id. at 256.
260. Id. at 255.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 254-55.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 254.
266. Id. at 254-55.
267. 23 N.E.3d 742, 753 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, 31 N.E.3d 976 (Ind. 2015).
268. Id. at 754.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. 33 N.E.3d 367, 370 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 35 N.E.3d 1290 (Ind. 2015).
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implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated the statement or
acted from a recent improper influence or motive for testifying.
The challenged evidence was a recording made at a police station wherein
the victim accused the defendant of injuring her.273 Also admitted by the State at
trial over no objection was a letter by the victim to the defendant's counsel
recanting her allegations of battery.274 Here, the court agreed with the defendant
that the recording was inadmissible hearsay.275 It explained there is a difference
between "merely challenging a witness's credibility" and what is required for the
rule to operate-namely, a charge of "fabricated testimony or improper...
motive" for testifying.276 The court stated there was not even a suggestion at trial
of such recent fabrication or improper motive.27 7 Rather, the evidence showed
only that defense counsel challenged the victim's credibility by questioning her
in detail about the different stories she had told about whether the defendant had
committed battery, noting they were "diametrically different accounts about what
happened.,278
D. Rule 803()-Present Sense Impression
In Mack v. State, the defendant also argued the trial court abused its
discretion when it permitted a police officer to testify about statements made to
him by a confidential informant (CI) to the effect that he had just discussed with
the defendant buying a "degreaser" that could be used to counterfeit currency.279
The question before the Indiana Court of Appeals was whether the testimony was
properly admitted as being within the "present sense impressions" exception to
the rule prohibiting hearsay. 280 The court concluded it was not.28' It explained the
exception for present sense impressions under Rule 803(1) allows introducing
"[a] statement describing or explaining an event, condition or transaction, made
while or immediately after the declarant perceived it."'282 To reach its conclusion
the testimony was improper, the court considered the evidence indicating the Cl's
statement to the officer occurred anywhere from between "a few" and "ten
minutes" after speaking with the defendant.283 The court explained Rule 803(1)
pertained to statements made "immediately after" perceiving an event.28 The
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 369-70.
275. Id. at 372.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 371.
279. 23 N.E.3d 742, 754-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, 31 N.E.3d 976 (Ind. 2015).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 755.
282. Id. (quoting IND. R. EvID. 803(1)).
283. Id.
284. Id.
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reason for this restriction was to provide reliability and prevent against the
opportunity for fabrication. 285 Here, the time periods at issue allowed "ample
time for a declarant to deliberate and possibly fabricate a statement, especially
where the declarant knows officers are looking for evidence of a particular type
of crime and the declarant himself has been implicated in the commission of that
crime. ,281
The court of appeals also concluded evidence did not meet the present sense
impression exception in Minor v. State.287 In Minor, the defendant argued the trial
court erred in excluding an unsworn out-of-court statement that was relevant to
his self-defense claim: a statement an individual, Dulin, made to the police to the
effect that the murder victim had told him he had a gun on him. 288 The defendant
acknowledged the proffered statement contained two levels of hearsay, but
argued each satisfied an exception to the hearsay rule. 289 As to the first layer, the
defendant argued the statement by the victim to Dulin constituted a present sense
impression. 29° The court disagreed, explaining that to satisfy Rule 803(1), a
statement must (1) "describe or explain an event or condition; (2) during orimmediately after its occurrence; and (3) it must be based upon the declarant's
perception of the event or condition." 29' Here, the statement at issue failed to
satisfy the first two requirements.292 First, the record was not specific as to the
victim's exact statement.293 Second, even if the statement did "adequately
describe[] or explain[] the condition of having a gun, there is no indication as to
when [the victim] purportedly made the statement," making it impossible to find
that the statement satisfied the immediateness requirement. 294
E. Rule 803(5)-Statements for Medical Treatment
In Steele v. State,295 the court of appeals considered a defendant's argument
that the trial court erred in admitting testimony and a medical report from a
forensic nurse examiner "who is contacted when violence is suspected as the
cause of a patient's injury. "296 The patient was the defendant's girlfriend and the
victim in the State's battery case. 297 The precise statement about which the
defendant complained was one that identified him as the perpetrator of the
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. 36 N.E.3d 1065, 1069-70 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 37 N.E.3d 960 (Ind. 2015).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1070.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. 42 N.E.3d 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
296. Id. at 141.
297. See id.
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violence.298 The court began by explaining Rule 803(4) permits the admission of
evidence that is otherwise hearsay if (1) "made by ... [one] seeking medical
diagnosis or treatment; (2) ... reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment; and
(3) describe[s] "medical history, symptoms, pain or sensations and their inception
or general cause.,, 299 The exception is premised on the rationale that individuals
are unlikely to lie to medical personnel because doing so may jeopardize their
chances of being properly treated."°
The court applied a two-part test to determine whether the hearsay evidence
offered under this exception was sufficiently reliable to be admitted: (1) whether
the declarant was motivated to speak truthfully so as "to promote diagnosis and
treatment" and (2) whether the statement at issue was one on which an medical
expert would rely "when rendering diagnosis or treatment. ' 0 ' It found the first
prong was easily satisfied because "when a patient consults a physician," one can
infer from the circumstances the purpose is to obtain diagnosis or treatment.
30 2
As to the second prong, the court explained even statements identifying
perpetrators are admissible as long as they "assist medical providers in
recommending potential treatment" for certain kinds of offenses, including cases
of domestic violence.30 3 To determine whether such statements do assist in
treatment, the trial court may consider the health care provider's testimony.
304
Here, the court found such testimony was sufficient to establish that the identity
of the person who committed the violence was necessary for treatment
purposes. 305 Importantly, the forensic nurse testified that "the cause of an injury
is important because the patient might be in danger and because the origin of the
injury might impact the type of tests necessary to determine whether there are
additional injuries 'that we're not seeing on the surface. "'306 The court further
noted the forensic nurse's report suggested counseling and gave phone numbers
for domestic violence shelters.30 7
F. Rule 804-Unavailability
The Indiana Rules of Evidence contain additional exceptions to the rule
against admitting hearsay in certain cases where the declarant is unavailable to
testify at trial. One such exception is Rule 804(b)(2) which governs "dying
declarations., 318 That rule allows the trial court to admit a declarant's out-of-
298. See id. at 141-42.
299. Id. at 142.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. See id. at 142-43.
306. Id. at 143.
307. Id.
308. See IND. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); see also Bishop v. State, 40 N.E.3d 935,944 (Ind. Ct. App.)
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court statement made while believing the declarant's death to be imminent and
which concerns the cause or circumstances of death.3 9 The rationale for
admitting such statements is that persons who believe they will imminently die
are not likely to lie.31° In Bishop v. State, the defendant challenged the trial
court's decision to allow the State to introduce a victim's statement identifying
Bishop as the person who shot him.3 1 The defendant argued the statement did not
satisfy the dying declaration rule because the circumstances showed the victim
"did not believe his death was imminent and had not abandoned all hope of
recovery. 31 2 In particular, Bishop pointed out that although the victim's blood
pressure was low at the time he made the statement, paramedics had told him he
would be okay.343 The State countered by noting the victim had suffered multiple
gunshot wounds and was bleeding.31 4 Moreover, he asked the paramedic multiple
times whether he was going to die, thus demonstrating the possibility of death
was at the center of his thoughts.31 5
The court of appeals agreed with the State that the evidence was sufficient
to satisfy Rule 804(b)(2).316 It explained that to satisfy the dying declaration rule,
the statement must be made by one who knows his "death... [is] imminent and
ha[s] abandoned all hope for recovery.' '3 7 At the same time, the court stated to
reach a conclusion about the declarant's state of mind, a "trial court may consider
the general statements, conduct, manner, symptoms, and condition of the
declarant, which flow as the reasonable and natural results from the extent and
character of his wound, or state of his illness."' 318 In this case, the evidence
showed, among other things, the victim had been shot five times, his wounds
were severe, he was yelling for help after being shot, at some point he had no
blood pressure, and he asked the paramedics numerous times whether he was
going to die.3t 9 Moreover, the victim died within hours of being transported to the
hospital.32°
The application of the "statement against interest" exception contained in
Rule 804(b)(3) was the subject of Beasley v. State.321 There, the court of appeals
(explaining "[o]ut-of-court statements offered in court for the truth of the matter asserted are
generally inadmissible hearsay," but one of many exceptions to the inadmissibility of hearsay is a
"dying declaration"), trans. denied, 40 N.E.3d 858 (Ind. 2015).
309. See Bishop, 40 N.E.3d at 944 (citing IND. R. EvID. 804(b)(2)).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 943.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 938,944.
314. Id. at 943-44.
315. Id. at 944-45.
316. Id. at 945.
317. Id. at 944.
318. Id. (quoting Wright v. State, 916 N.E.2d 269, 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).
319. Id. at 944-45.
320. Id.
321. 30 N.E.3d 56,65-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), affd in part, vacated in part, 46 N.E.3d 1232
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explained that Rule 804(b)(3) pertains to statements
that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made
only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so
contrary to the declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so
great a tendency to invalidate the declarant's claim against someone else
or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability.
3 22
Citing to the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Jervis v. State, the court
of appeals noted:
the rationale for allowing statements against interest into evidence is that
the declarant would only make such a statement if it were true because
the content of the statement goes against the declarant's interests, and
that this rationale fails if the declarant did not believe the state was
against his or her interest.323
Analyzing the content of the statement at issue, the court of appeals
concluded the statement against interest exception was not applicable.324 Among
other things, the declarant stated he observed the defendant reaching into his
waistband for a gun and the declarant then reached for it.325 The declarant further
stated the two fought for control of the gun and it went off such that the declarant
shot someone in the face.326 These statements, said the court of appeals,
suggested only the declarant was forced to defend himself from an attack by the
defendant, making it a stretch to suggest the declarant knew that by so stating he
was placing himself in legal jeopardy.327
VII. AUTHENTICATION OF EVIDENCE AND BEST EVIDENCE
(RULES 901 AND 1002-1004)
Under Rule 901, the proponent of evidence must authenticate it by showing
the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.328 The proponent may
authenticate evidence by either direct or circumstantial evidence. 329 For example,
one may authenticate an item through a witness with knowledge who testifies
that the item is what it is claimed to be.33° One may also produce evidence about
(Ind. 2016).
322. Id. at 65 (quoting IND. R. EvID. 804(b)(3)).
323. Id. at 66-67 (citing Jervis v. State, 679 N.E.2d 875 (Ind. 1997)).
324. Id. at 67.
325. Id. at 66.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 67.
328. See IND. R. EVID. 901.
329. See Strunk v. State, 44 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 41 N.E.3d 691 (Ind.
2015) (citing Newman v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1109, 1111 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)) (stating that
"[a]uthentication of an exhibit can be established by either 'direct or circumstantial evidence"').
330. Strunk, 44 N.E.3d at 5.
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the item's distinctive characteristics taken together with all the circumstances.33'
Once the proponent shows by a "reasonable probability" the item is what the
proponent claims it to be,332 "any inconclusiveness regarding the exhibit's
connection with the events at issue goes to the exhibit's weight, not its
admissibility. 333
In Strunk v. State, the court of appeals applied these standards in the context
of the defendant's claim that the State had failed to authenticate properly as
belonging to him a Facebook message wherein he essentially acknowledged hehad molested his child victim.334 The court concluded the message was properly
admitted, having been authenticated by witness testimony.335 The court noted the
victim testified she was familiar with the defendant's Facebook page and with theprofile picture of a wolf that he used on the page, and she had communicated
with him through the same profile page on previous occasions.336 The victim's
mother also identified the defendant's Facebook profile page, stating she had
seen it before because she was one of the defendant's mutual friends.3 37
The court of appeals reached a similar conclusion in Wilson v. State, a case
where the defendant argued certain Twitter posts purportedly authored by him
and connecting him to gang activity and guns were not properly authenticated.338
The court noted it had addressed a similar fact pattern in Pavlovich, a case
involving the authentication of text and email messages. 339 In Pavlovich, the court
concluded such messages were properly authenticated despite no direct evidence
linking the defendant to the phone number or email address that sent the
messages.34' There, the messages were properly authenticated under Rule 901 by
witness testimony and other circumstantial evidence relating to the content of the
messages. 341 In Wilson, the court also concluded the State had presentedsufficient evidence to authenticate the Twitter posts. 342 A witness testified she
communicated with the defendant on Twitter and the account from which themessages were sent belonged to him based on the name used and the header ofthe account.343 In addition, pictures on the account showed the defendant holding
331. Id.
332. Wilson v. State, 30N.E.3d 1264, 1268 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 35 N.E.3d 671 (Ind.
2015).
333. Strunk, 44 N.E.3d at 5.
334. See id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See id.
338. Wilson v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1264, 1265-68 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 35 N.E.3d 671
(Ind. 2015).
339. Id. at 1268 (citing Pavlovich v. State, 6 N.E.3d 969, 976 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied,
9 N.E.3d 678 (Ind. 2014)).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1269.
343. Id. at 1268-69.
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guns that matched those used in the murder. 3' Moreover, the same witness
testified the defendant was a member of the Glen Park gang and he often used the
terms in the Twitter messages in other communications over the Internet.345
The court of appeals considered whether a video recording violated best
evidence principles in Wise v. State.' The best evidence principles provide that
". [a]n original writing, recording, or photograph is required to prove its content'
unless the Rules of Evidence or a statute provide otherwise. ' 347 Nevertheless, "a
duplicate... [may be admitted] to the same extent as an original unless a genuine
question is raised about the original's authenticity or the circumstances make it
unfair to admit the duplicate. 348 In Wise, the defendant complained about the
admission of video recordings made by the victim in a rape case who alleged the
defendant had sexual intercourse with her while she was asleep after he had
slipped Xanax into her canned sodas.349 The videos at issue were originally
stored on the defendant's phone (tending to show that he was having sex or
attempting to have sex with the victim while she was asleep), but the victim used
a camcorder to make a separate recording of those videos. 350 In doing so, she also
changed the titles and dates on the recordings so the defendant would know she
had seen the videos.35 ' By the time of trial, the defendant's phone was no longer
available and the original videos could not be retrieved from it.352 The court of
appeals agreed with the trial court that permitting the State to introduce the
camcorder version of the videos did not violate the best evidence rule under the
circumstances.353
Specifically, the court noted under Rule 1004(a), "the best evidence rule
permits admission into evidence of a duplicate recording when 'all originals..
.[have been] lost or destroyed, and not by the proponent acting in bad faith."'
354
Here, the videos on the phone were lost because the defendant replaced the phone
on which they were stored.355 Further, while the victim's camcorder version of
the videos reflected the changed dates and titles on the original videos, the court
noted the "handheld camera recording of the videos on ... [the defendant's]
cellular phone display no evidence of tampering or other alteration, let alone loss
of the content of the videos themselves."356 Thus, they were admissible.357
344. Id. at 1269.
345. Id.
346. 26 N.E.3d 137, 140 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 31 N.E.3d 975 (Ind. 2015).
347. Id. at 143 (citing IND. R. EVID. 1002).
348. Id. (citing IND. R. EvID. 1003).
349. Id. at 139-41.
350. Id. at 142.
351. Id. at 139-40.
352. Id. at 142.
353. Id. at 142-43.
354. Id. at 143 (citing IND. R. EvID. 1004(a)).
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 143-44.
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CONCLUSION
As this survey shows, Indiana courts are regularly confronted with challenges
to the admission of evidence requiring them to consult, interpret, and apply theIndiana Rules of Evidence. By summarizing the more important recent
developments in this area of practice, this survey hopes to serve as a useful guide
for attorneys, judges, and other interested parties.
